Abstract-There are many technologies of software protection to prevent software from being attacked, such as software piracy, tampering, and reverse engineering, but what about the effectiveness of them is hard to answer. This paper presents a new evaluation method considering attack cost as the metric to evaluate the effectiveness of software protection under the circumstances of fulfilling assumptions that all software can be attacked successfully. We propose a new attack model, called MPN, and deduce an approach to calculate attack cost with it. Moreover, we also verify the approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Software protection technologies were born to avoid threats of software piracy, tampering, and reverse engineering. But whether and how these protection technologies are effective are still an unsolved problem. Our motivation derives from how to evaluate the effectiveness of software protection by measuring attack cost. Now, there is no accepted approach was widely accepted as a common metric. But many researchers have done lots of relevant works, and we can classify them in two groups. ① Evaluation based on Theoretical Analysis [1] [2] [3] [4] , which measures or prove the effectiveness of software protection through theoretical analysis. ② Evaluation based on Attack [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] which measures or proof from the view of attack. Technically, the evaluation approach in this paper belongs to the second group. Rather than doing manual attack experiment or designing common attack tools, we describe software attacks with an attack model. In this paper: Section 2 introduces an attack model called MPN. In Section 3, discuss the method to evaluate the effectiveness of software protection with the metric "attack cost". We verify the evaluation method through a case in Section 4. Section 5 concludes this paper.
II. EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION WITH PETRI NET
Attack Net model based on Petri Net was first proposed by McDermott [10] . The basic Petri Net [11] is a three-tuple (P, T, F) . The flexibility of Petri Net makes that it can abstract attack process and refine it. It can indicate more information. So, we use Petri Net to model software attacks.
A. Primary elements in Software Attack
In an informal attack description, there are six types of elements are listed by Steffan [12] . According to that list, we made new description in following Table. The purpose of a software attack process.
Method
The way to achieve Goal. There are many Methods in a process.
State
Intermediate process of software attack.
Technique
The attack technique to attack software in a attack process.
Sub-goal
The purpose of to achieve States. Action Performing Technique. Precondition The condition to perform the attack technique.
Influence The consequence after performing the attack technique.
There are many Methods to finish a Goal, and each Method includes many States and Techniques. Fig. 1 Then we can mapping the primary elements in Table I into the counterpart in Fig.1 as follows. 
B. Mapping Primary elements into Marked Petri Net

1). Attacker and Object
Attacker is the people executing attack based on Petri net. Object is the software that Attacker want to attack. And they both can be seen from the Petri net.
2). Goal, Sub-goal, State and Technique In Fig.1 
4). Precondition, Action and Influence
The elements introduced above belong to static properties. The difference between Marked Petri Net [13] and the basic one is that the Marked Petri Net has a Token, which is a dynamic object. In the attacking process, Token is moved from one State to next one. If the condition is satisfied, an event will be enabled, that means in its input there are enough Tokens. Firing event will change the number and position of Token. Enabling event is just the Precondition; firing event is just the Action; changing Token is the influence of the Action.
C. Software Attack Modeling
Definition 1 MPN: which is software attack modeling based on Marked Petri Net, including six elements (P, T, F, Path, Rate, Cost), among which, first three elements come from the basic Petri Net; Path is a finite set of Methods. Rate and Cost respectively stand for attack rate and attack cost.
Based on the software attack model MPN and software attack process, we give the following definition. Table I) .
Definition 3 Attack Rate: Be used to quantify the rate of attack progress in one Attack Path. It stands for Precondition of each Technique, and it will be changed dynamically when attacking.
We quantify attack process with Attack Rate, and it is instantiated as Token in MPN. Let R(p i ) stands for Attack Rate's value of reaching State p i , and then R(p i ) is more than or equal to 0, also less than or equal to 1. While R(p i ) is equal to 1, the Goal of attack will be achieved, and p i is the last State in SMMPN. Meanwhile, R(t i ) stands for increased attack rate after activating technique t i , and we can get a conclusion: R(p i+1 ) ≥ R(t 1 ) + R(t 2 ) + …+ R. At first, Token is assigned 0 in P i . After performing Technique t i , the Token= R(P i-1 )+ R(t i ) in P i . Fig.2 presents the progress of attack along Path a . R(t i )= R(P i+1 )-R(P i ) is the increment of Rate caused by firing t i in actual attacking. 
Also, we can get: △μ =μ i+1 -μ i , and it can be seen as the importance of t i according to △μ . If t i is more important, △ μ will be larger. In practice, it is affected by many factors, for example, attack scene, attack experience. So, we need to determine it through analyzing t i in depth.
Above all, we can get following conclusion: the effect of Method displayed by an Attack Path Path a consist of firing every t in Path a .
As the only dynamic behavior in Attack Path, firing t is the reason that Attack Cost is produced. Then, in Attack Path Path a , Cost(Path a ) is made up of the attack cost produced by firing each t.
III. EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION WITH SAPMMON
From the above mentioned, when evaluating effectiveness the metric can use the attack cost.
A. Metric Calculation
Let c i be the attack cost produced by firing Technique t i . Sub-goals of different t may be the same, but the c of these t may be yet different. 
To get more accurate results, we decompose the technique based on Software Security Patterns [14] into some smaller attack units. We named the small attack units as ae, main attack units are shown in Table II . 
These data are obtained from attack log. For example, technique "DUMP" is decomposed by "Memory spying" and "Data lifting", The attack log is as follows. DUMP: ae 2 :memory operation times ae 11: code size So, cost(t DUMP ) = c(ae 2 ) + c(ae 11 ). Next, divided ae into five ranks, and value of ae is set according to attack experience.
Rank A: 1(sac). attack automatically absolutely. Rank B: 5(sac).it is feasible to attack automatically absolutely by designing a special tool. Rank C: 10(sac). attack manually with some assistant tools, which could provide much help. Rank D: 15(sac). attack manually with some tools which could only provide less help. Rank E: 20(sac). attack manually, there is no tools to provide help.
In which, sac is the unit of software attack cost. Then, calculate c(ae) by (3) in following. 
In (3), Rank(ae) is the function to get ae's Rank and Value(ae) is the function to calculate ae's information value. But, it needs to normalize Value(ae) based on the data normalization theory, and Value(ae)=lg(Value(ae)).
According to (1) , (2), (3), we can get:
Cost P Grade ae Value ae
This attack modeling will be perfected with appearance of new Techniques in future and the Rank of attack units may be changed.
IV. A CASE STUDY
A. Background 1). Serial Numbers
This is often used to make user use the software legally [15] . If user had paid for the software, the developer will provide a unique Serial Number. Of course, in software there is an algorithm to certify the input number.
2). Control Flow Flattening
This [4] is a control obfuscation technique, which can obfuscate original control logic into a flatten control flow. The original software is "SerialNum.exe" , and "SerialNum-Obf.exe" is the protected software protected by the tool introduced in [16] .
3). Attacks on Serial Numbers First, we find some programs like "Crackme", then attack them manually. Then, we modeled the attack introduced in [15] , adding other methods with new codes into the program. At last, the MPN can be constructed for attacking against checking program by Serial Number. The meaning of each State and Technique is shown in Table III.   TABLE III . meaning of each P and T in Fig. 3 
P/T
Meaning p 0 Original program p 1 The codes had been assembled p 2 The Basic Segments have been obtained p 3 Obtain the performed Basic Segments p 4 Obtain the Key Segment p 5 Obtain the cracked program t 0
Disassemble the program t 1 Partition codes in some Basic Segments t 2 Mark performed Basic Segments t 3 locate the Key Segment and modify Key Instruction among it t 4 Monitor memory change and terminate when generating the address of Fail block, and Key Block is the terminated block. t 5 Add New Codes into the program; Key Block always jumps to New Codes.
Obviously, two attack paths are included in Fig. 3 .
• [4, 16, 17] . Next, we will evaluate the technique with our proposed method.
B. Effectiveness Evaluation of Control Flow Flatenning
Firstly, determine ae in each Technique t i , which are as follows: [18] is used to analyze SeriaNuml.exe and SerialNum-Obf.exe to obtain sizes of .text sections. Some scripts and plug-ins in IDA [19] to collect data, which includes: amount of jmp and conditional jump instruction; amount of the re-performed instructions; amount of Basic segments performed; checking the redundant space in Object. The value of each ea is shown in Table IV . 
C. Analysis
In Path1 and Path2, both of attack costs of attacking on SerialNum.exe are lower than SerialNum-Obj.exe. Obviously, we can quantize the effectiveness of the Control Flow Flattening by attack cost which is the evaluation metric we proposed. Diff is defined as the difference of attack Cost between unprotected and protected program.
Diff(Path2)= 130.4-116.3 =14.1(sac) So we can evaluate the protection by compare the Diff, the bigger, the better. But if we consider the performance of the software, the result may be different, because some protection technologies bring little performance penalty, but can improve security of the software too much.
V. CONCLUSION
In the paper, a new approach is presented to evaluate effectiveness of software protection, and in which attack cost is considered as the evaluation metric. An attack model is introduced with Marked Petri Net, and give a way to calculate the attack cost in attack process with MPN. At last, the feasibility and reasonability of our method are tested and verified through evaluating effectiveness of Control Flow Flattening. We can see that attack cost can quantize the effectiveness of the protection according to the experiment results. In the way, we can evaluate effectiveness of software protection according to Diff.
